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Westphalian sovereignty: rights, intervention, 
meaning and context 
 
P.A. Hayman and John Williams 
Abstract 
Over the last two centuries or so sovereignty has proved to be an enigmatic 
institution, at once constant and changing. Presently, it faces sustained and diffuse 
siege. Relatively few studies have approached this enigmatic institution from a 
semantic angle. This paper assesses the meaning of sovereignty within a framework 
of competing logics as it faces up to a key normative challenge – human rights ─ 
bringing together the apparently conflicting norms of non-intervention and 
intervention against a background of discourse analysis. From ‘Westphalia’ to the 
current logics of action and normative theory, the discussion places the institution of 
sovereignty against current, intra-disciplinary factors as an addition to the literature 
that serves to underscore how a fundamentally re-imagined concept is required, in 
theory and practice, to account for and promote humanitarian needs. 
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Westphalia: meaning and context 
[The Peace of Westphalia] is null, void, invalid, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, 
empty of meaning and effect for all time.     Pope Innocent X 
 
The question of sovereignty 
Over the last two centuries or so sovereignty has proved to be an enigmatic 
institution, at once constant and changing. It is the quality (and essentially the 
meaning) of it which dictates how it has been applied as a fundamental signifier of a 
particular world order by certain active and passive states. Presently, it faces sustained 
and diffuse siege.  
Countless studies have charted the course of this institution and what has been 
affecting it in the contemporary world. Relatively few have approached it from a 
semantic angle, to discuss the implications of pressures regarding the meaning of 
sovereignty – fewer still how we might assess what it means to be sovereign. This 
discussion will assess the meaning of sovereignty within a framework of competing 
logics as it faces up to a key normative challenge – human rights. More specifically, it 
will bring together the apparently conflicting norms of non-intervention and 
intervention against a background of discourse analysis.  
 The period of sovereignty’s ascendancy is (or was) statist. Now, though, 
variables from the social world are distorting the settled equation, demanding fresh 
approaches to the necessary and right extent of state power specifically regarding 
citizens. The principles of human rights, and their active, if imperfect, manifestation 
in the form of humanitarian intervention, are anomalous to what has gone before.  
 It has traditionally been difficult to see past Westphalian sovereignty. With its 
central norm of non-intervention, it has frequently been conceptually split to 
accommodate state behaviour in both domestic and international contexts which are 
 2 
presumed to be essentially different situations. Human rights discourse has a 
significant, but distinctive, impact on both sides of this bifurcation. The issue here is 
whether this impact on either or both manifestations is sufficiently tectonic to alter the 
landscape of the international system – to assess not so much what lies on the horizon 
but whether we are still looking in the right direction. 
The discussion will be directed thematically by the interpretations of ontology 
and norms that constitute and inform the development of sovereignty, and how its 
disruption might be recognised and manifested. The aim is to bring together the 
duality of Westphalian sovereignty through the idea of ‘old’ and ‘new’ sovereignty 
‘games’ and the emerging norm of intervention, with a view to offering some analysis 
of the material and ideological complexity involved in re-imagining the meaning of 
sovereignty and with it the international system. 
 
Westphalia: war and words 
The Peace of Westphalia brought to a well-deliberated end the Thirty Years War, a 
conflict that had ravaged and blackened a Europe rent wide open by the possibilities 
of self-determination in identity and government. From then on, ‘Westphalia’ has 
become shorthand for a state management system that has held sway over 
international relations generating the received wisdom that history and long-standing 
is able to imbue. ‘1648’, as with all dates of significance, has increasingly run the 
gauntlet of de-contextualised reference, generating a reified and static dominant 
meaning. 
This position has been under assault in recent years. The sceptics’ view is 
summarised concisely by Osiander; “…the discipline theorizes against the backdrop 
of a past that is largely imaginary…the accepted IR narrative about Westphalia is a 
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myth.”1 The Peace of Westphalia is increasingly under attack from constructivists and 
others whose work questions both the established account of what happened leading 
up to 1648 and whether it should mean what it does today. 
 Westphalia is declared mythic because it carries the weight of age, but history 
is not a bygone conclusion. Its threads are there to be unpicked; “…it is not 
teleological, but it is retrospectively intelligible.”2 The Peace achieved many things, 
but detractors claim that the content of the treaties bears little or no resemblance to 
what sovereignty has become. Teschke outlines some of these (non) contributory 
factors:  
“The most obvious indicator of Westphalia’s non-modernity lies in the 
nature of the contracting political regimes. The treaties were not 
concluded between states but between rulers, or, to be more precise, 
between private persons and corporate bodies…none of the signatories 
to the treaties headed a modern state, nor did any contracting polity 
become one as a result of 1648.”3 
 
The question which must necessarily follow is, does this matter? The answer hinges to 
a great extent on whether the legitimacy and meaning of a concept is dependent on 
that concept being derived either from fact or principle. Holsti contextualises 
Westphalia, in terms of subsequent conflicts; “the Peace…created a framework that 
would sustain the political fragmentation of Europe.”4 This indeed it did, setting in 
motion a pattern of legitimate fragmentation which spread from its European core. 
But this diffusion was neither uniform nor spontaneous; “By sanctifying Europe’s 
centrifugal forces, by providing a legal basis for the developing territorial 
particularisms of Europe…the documents licensed an anarchical dynastic states 
system and the internal consolidation of its members.”5 
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So anarchy began in 1648? If so, Westphalia appears to pose more questions 
than it answers. If anarchy had a starting date (be it Westphalia or not), its normative 
weight (in terms of non-intervention) is subject to challenge. That sovereign states 
might have their particular authority bestowed upon them by a tangible legitimating 
treaty is an idea generally long and conveniently forgotten by today’s international 
arbiters of authority. 
Rather than establishing the authority of sovereignty built upon the norm of 
non-intervention for the sake of future self-defence, participants in the Thirty Years 
War did so as a result of having reached a point of no return and were happy to sign a 
contract of political and economic reprieve. Whether this matters for the purpose of 
identifying ‘Westphalian’ traits is difficult to ascertain. That sovereignty was the 
overwhelming distraction of nineteenth and twentieth century scholars,
6
 to the point 
of misrepresenting its foundations, is not a hindrance to meaning if the rightful 
domain of IR is not history but politics. The meaning of sovereignty does not lie in 
pursuing the historical ‘truth’ of Westphalia, but in how the myth of Westphalia has 
been used to political effect. These two need not be contradictory, but they are 
certainly not coterminous. 
Importantly “the architects of Westphalia thought in terms of statics. The 
solutions to the religious and hegemony problems were to be permanent.”7 The Peace 
was regarded as the solution to problems timeless and universal. It was not designed 
as a flexible, legalistic precedent, but instead as a fixed ‘roadmap’ for future policy 
and action. A recurring theme that conforms to the image of statehood (or its 
historical equivalent) is that the “…semantics of restoration reflected the prevailing 
consensus that the treaties should not enact new principles of international public law, 
but rather codify the reversal to the status quo ante bellum.”8 The idea of sovereignty 
 5 
and its consequence of anarchy as static or timeless or universal has been vital to the 
institutionalisation and operationalisation of the ‘meaning’ of sovereignty. 
For Osiander, and other critics, traditional IR has thought in the same terms of 
statics, so that “the lack of a clear, explicit break with the old type of account (with its 
‘sovereignty-centred interpretive overlay’) has made it easier for IR to cling to its 
version of it, extreme and over-simplified as it is even in comparison to many older 
historical writings.”9 IR is thus to be found gazing contentedly at the shadows dancing 
on the cave walls. 
The phenomenon is that “dates cannot lie, and the more distant the dates, the 
less the willingness to uncover their social content.”10 The implications for this study 
lie in whether sovereignty’s meaning is different if it is not firmly embedded in the 
distant, reinforcing past. Using the past as a positivist lens through which to focus the 
future, and vice versa, seems an inherently limiting exercise. As Jackson points out, 
“…conceptual and linguistic categories available to the statespeople at Westphalia 
were those of the late medieval era.”11 Assuming that meaning has remained static 
ever since, as the dominant narrative of Westphalia tends to do, supports a positivist 
desire to treat social concepts as though they were material phenomena, reinforcing 
the static approach to sovereignty. However, whilst sovereignty has arguably seen the 
endurance of certain medieval notions into the modern world, social dynamics have 
seen these reinterpreted in the face of the looming threat of anachronism.
12
  
Jackson concisely highlights what is apparently paradoxical about 
sovereignty’s qualities and application, especially during imperial expansion: 
“…in the relations of European states to each other Westphalia 
inverted the practices of medieval Europe. But in the relations of 
European states to political authorities outside the European heartland 
and in the rest of the world Westphalia reiterated Medieval practices 
which asserted the superiority of Latin Christendom or Western 
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civilization, the moral inequality of peoples (and) the right of 
intervention….”13 
 
Sovereignty’s meaning was thus dynamic, in the sense of ordering global and not just 
European practices, but static in its ability to maintain its peculiar status within its 
own accommodating sphere. In the language of constructivism, “…authority is 
constituted at least in part by mutual recognition: A state does not practice sovereign 
powers…unless it is surrounded by a community of states that recognises these 
powers.”14 The duality of sovereignty is intriguing. If sovereignty can be split into 
parallel discourses, one of continuity and one of change, does it lose its integrity? And 
does existence as a sovereign – within sovereignty – mean qualitatively less or more 
than it has since the establishment of the norm of non-intervention? 
 
Meaning and duality 
As the European powers gradually colonised the rest of the world in the centuries 
following 1648, sovereignty became not just the legitimating right of autonomous 
authority, but a standard to be achieved prior to official recognition. This new form 
(or expression of the form) of sovereignty enables the observer to visualise it not as a 
singularity, but as structurally diarchic. The sovereignty of the European states 
required the contrast to the subordination of the colonies to acquire meaning, and a 
normative contrast – civilisation versus barbarism – to acquire legitimacy. 
Westphalian sovereignty, with its integral norm of non-intervention, has been used for 
different ends, but consistently to accommodate simultaneous continuity and change 
within the expanding universe of the international system.  
 This duality, this stretching-to-fit, is symptomatic of the deeper qualities of 
sovereignty. These two typologies of the popular use of sovereignty are usefully 
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characterised as the ‘old’ sovereignty game and the ‘new’ sovereignty game.15 The 
‘old’ game is the preserve of the establishment in terms of use, both passive and 
proactive. The ‘new’ game is indicative not only of a temporal shift, but also of the 
newly arising material, constitutional and social conditions. This is best illustrated by 
de-colonisation and the resulting progeny of sovereign masters; “European states no 
longer demanded Christianity, but instead a secularised ‘standard of civilization’ for 
aspiring states.”16 
 Using the analogy of parallel games (or ‘fields’) within which states operate 
(having themselves been the creators) sets up the parameters for debating continuity 
and change and their relevance to the issue of sovereignty and norms. The next step is 
to account for the reasoning that underpins continuity and the reasoning that 
encourages change in sovereignty’s meaning. March and Olsen have detailed the 
‘logics of action’17 that states follow in order to steer a justifiable course, preferably 
objectively, but often subjectively. 
 These logics are divisible into types that fit the continuity/change thesis. 
Logics of appropriateness serve as the reasoning tools applied where “…political 
institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate 
actions in terms of relations between roles and situations.”18 Logics of 
consequentiality, on the other hand, describe the scenario when “…behaviours are 
driven by preferences and expectations about consequences. Behaviour is wilful, 
reflecting an attempt to make outcomes fulfil subjective desires, to the extent 
possible.”19 
 This suggests that status quo behaviour – ‘appropriate’ behaviour – is 
objective, and that continuity by way of adherence to a settled trajectory is a 
transparent process. This reinforces the positivist preference for a static meaning of 
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sovereignty, adding methodological weight to the pressure of venerability in this 
direction. Change, or at least the management of it, is then significantly more 
complex; states follow internally legitimate procedures, perhaps at the expense of 
logical form. This field of mediate inferences is regulated by rules which, although 
naturally occurring in both cases, can again usefully be split for this discussion as an 
illustrative aid. 
 Fundamental to the discourse of continuity are the ‘constitutive’ rules of 
sovereignty, which are “…foundational, they define the core features of what 
sovereignty is.”20 Concerning change, Sørensen discusses the regulatory rules of 
“…different sovereignty games played by different types of sovereign state,”21 and 
uses a definition from Searle which places them as rules that “…regulate antecedently 
existing activities.”22 That is, there is a formal structure within which progress 
requires precedent. Sørensen actually refers to regulative rules as the “…dynamic 
element of continuity,”23 which is apt for describing the intramural extension of 
sovereignty and sovereign thinking. 
 The parallel discourses of continuity and change are markers for the 
reassessment of Westphalian sovereignty. In keeping with the theme of bifurcation, 
the distinction between negative and positive sovereignty serves to frame the 
discussion. The former has been defined simply as “…freedom from outside 
interference,”24 and the latter as “…the means which enable states to take advantage 
of their independence.”25 The distinction is between managing internal and external 
affairs with the implied assent of the international system and the ability to do so 
without it. 
 The continuity thesis involves the positioning of ‘players’ and the original 
game itself. The discussion will move from sovereignty as ontological priority, 
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through a process of familiarisation and significantly localised codification, to its 
placement regarding the system. Themes of detachment from that system and the 
characteristics of the working and aspiring norms will be analysed. 
 
The rules of the continuity game 
March and Olsen’s logics of action are guides to reason in politics – employing logic 
provides a lens through which to attempt order and to establish an observable system. 
Logic and its methods are frequently associated with society, rules and the common 
good. Apparently to prevent anarchy spectacularly descending into chaos, actors 
follow rules that promote existing values. In order to achieve and maintain continuity, 
the rules of the (‘old’) sovereignty game need to express permanence – both for their 
own integrity and that of which they govern. In establishing appropriateness, “the 
process maintains consistency in action primarily through the creation of typologies 
of similarity, rather than through a derivation of action from stable interests or 
wants.”26 Constant reproduction of behaviour – conditioned behaviour – that results in 
a desired outcome which (not by chance) conforms to the establishment, is logically 
optimal for leading and aspirational actors. 
 These constitutive rules which form institutions are defined as “…persistent 
and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, 
constrain activity, and shape expectations…”27 By Searle’s formula, “X counts as Y 
in context C”28 – the state counts as sovereign in the context of the (sovereignty 
based) international system. So for a state to be fully realised it must follow 
prescriptive rules that are frequently informal and additionally rely on external 
legitimation for this particular sovereign status. What marks the boundary between 
‘sovereign’ and ‘unsovereign’ in this sense is for theorists substantially more than a 
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line in the sand. Testing the quality of this sovereignty in terms of normative integrity 
requires confronting a situation where “…a state does either have sovereignty in the 
sense of constitutional independence or it does not have it…there is no half-way 
house, no legal in-between.”29  
 But this is constitutional independence with a difference. Even without the 
inconsistencies posed by lacunae, the peculiarity of sovereignty is that it is shared 
independence – that is, independence on terms. If, then, the received wisdom of 
political logic governs this system having created it from normative foundations, is it 
capable of withstanding a substantial and sustained normative challenge? Can the 
static meaning of sovereignty endure in the face of demands for change that appeal to 
the logic of consequentiality that helped to create the old sovereignty game in the first 
place? 
 Continuity is thus marked by a focus on previously achieved goals and 
sovereignty’s meaning, especially its normative meaning, is tied to protecting those 
achievements. If sovereign states “…elect…to proselytise it must be within the rules 
of the game. This would exclude crusades, jihads, state-sponsored terrorism, the 
global communist revolution, forcibly making the world safe for democracy, and any 
other actions in contempt of sovereignty.”30 By these terms, intervention is so 
anomalous to the game as barely even to exist at all. But the game is characterised by 
what might be deemed a flaw regarding its longevity. 
In the classical game which still exists in the more developed parts of the 
world, players “… are logically and in many cases historically prior to the game. They 
are rulers of substantial political systems who are endowed with domestic authority 
and power and are therefore credible internationally: [they possess] empirical 
statehood.”31  
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 If this is the case, sovereignty is teleologically incomplete, not only because of 
categorical differences in the quality of states, but also by the problematic ranking of 
the historically prior above the ontologically prior. This can be understood as a 
pragmatic move, appealing to a realist approach in which what is ‘right’ and questions 
of ‘ought’ bow to what actually happened and what will happen by whatever means 
for whatever ends. However, if sovereignty is to possess a static meaning 
underpinning a logic of appropriateness, it must stake out a more deontological 
position, to avoid the fate of historiographic representation. Such positions just are, 
and they are good, in the purest philosophical terms. 
 Sovereignty in its (neo)realist and (neo)liberal conception carries with it such 
a deontological element, forgetful of the historical story to be told and in accordance 
with the mythic version of Westphalia. This simultaneously reinforces the constitutive 
character of the rules associated with sovereignty and the logic of appropriateness that 
is both part of and an offshoot from those rules. However, it carries with it a 
conceptual caveat, that is, “to accept sovereignty is to create the notion of intervention 
and to accept the impermissibility of intervention as a challenge to both exclusion and 
authority.”32 In other words, what sovereignty is designed not to be becomes its 
essence. We can only understand the appropriateness of acting in accordance with the 
rules of the old sovereignty game if we are simultaneously aware of what is 
inappropriate, with intervention standing as the exemplar. 
 Chopra goes further in turning sovereignty on its head ─ “The theory of 
sovereignty is entirely incompatible with territorial limitations and frontiers”33 ─ on 
the grounds that it has no identity and hence no boundaries. Without boundaries, how 
can we conceive and identify intervention and, by extension, appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour? Sovereignty belies an existence as a misconceived nebula. It 
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is believed to be real, it is assigned duties of political motivation and so it is real. So 
what of normative change in the international system? Chopra’s definition usefully re-
positions sovereignty as removed from its false elevation as ‘system’ in itself to a less 
exalted reification (as opposed to deification) – “sovereignty is not a fact … it is a 
characteristic and is not measurable as more or less … it is definitive and does not 
permit derogation without being rendered illogical.”34 If so, what of normative change 
in the international system? 
 
Normative theory and non-intervention 
To understand the impact of normative change, it is useful to have in mind the 
processes underpinning politically obligatory action. March and Olsen have compiled 
‘conventional litanies’ for action.35 In the case of the ‘old’ game of continuity, actors 
are said to approach given situations by asking themselves certain key questions and 
then providing an answer: “What kind of situation is this? Who am I? How 
appropriate are different actions for me in this situation? And then; do what is most 
appropriate.”36 Add to this Dyer’s useful working definition of normative theory: 
“[It]…is based on the primacy of norms and normative systems and 
structures, and thus subverts the traditional distinctions of is/ought and 
fact/value by locating all foundations in value choice. Normative 
theory concerns both the structure of knowledge and the framework of 
political reference.”37 
 
The end product leaves the difference between theory and practice apparently 
insurmountable on grounds other than normative considerations as these provide the 
basis for the constitutive rules that grant the litany of appropriate action its 
plausibility. The existence of “…the gap between normative commitments and 
instruments allows governments to abuse human rights with virtual impunity,”38 
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implying a breakdown along the line between intent, communication and action. Or 
are normative commitments the preserve of the few? Are they numerically and 
qualitatively divisible amongst states in the international system on the basis of their 
position as players of the old or new sovereignty game? Are they divisible at all? 
 If norms can change, it could be that the transformations are instigated by the 
international system in its ‘old’ sovereignty guise, or that the established game is 
adaptable and therefore somehow permeable. As Wheeler writes, “Procedural 
accounts of international legitimacy are predicated on the assumption that the test of 
legitimacy is state practice.”39 But legitimacy is as fluid or as stable as sovereignty 
and a powerful case can be made for the superiority of accounts of legitimacy 
stressing its normative content over procedural regularity. 
 Being a product of history is what defines adherents to the continuity thesis, 
granting it the weight of ages. To link Westphalia to late modernity, the international 
society of leading states, acting in concert, have built the edifice of sovereignty. Like 
bricks and mortar, it now stands detached from the sensitivities of organic vessels. 
This might imply that a reversal of the process of detachment could facilitate a 
congruence of human concerns – the Sovereign sharing the vision of subject. But a 
regression from institutional anarchy to monarchy or some other anthropic form is 
inconceivable. 
 What sovereignty means, then, is a product of its constitutive elements, and 
how they are normatively formed and influenced. The enabling chain consists of the 
links (sovereignty–non-intervention–state will) and its integrity depends on whether 
any point is prone to outside pressure. Strength is derived from the unity of actors and 
“the process maintains consistency in action primarily through the creation of 
typologies of similarity, rather than through a derivation of action from stable 
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interests or wants.”40 It is the consistent quality of these links that dictates future 
action.  
 This raises the issue of whether intervention, especially when ostensibly based 
upon the tenets of human rights, is qualitatively different enough to upset the order of 
things. This issue is not of principal concern here, although  an assumption of its merit 
is enough to problematise the meaning of sovereignty. As for non-intervention, the 
principle itself rests upon “…placing order between states before justice for the 
responsibility of making a decision as to whether an act or institution within any of 
them is just or unjust.”41 This suggests pervasive elements of awareness and choice – 
passivity as a considered option. If this is so, continuity is a preference swayed by the 
cost of non-compliance.  
 Vincent adds to the ‘weight debate’ with a timely riposte to the assumption of 
moral high-ground. That is, non-intervention’s superiority is due to “…the lack of a 
common Almighty, of a coherent and pervasive morality which transcends 
international frontiers and which might then inform and justify particular acts of 
intervention.”42 Equally, though, human rights (in its most basic, elemental form) 
could constitute that morality by providing an alternative constitutive rule, changing 
the outcome of the litany of appropriate action. 
 Kratochwil, in discussing the symbiosis of legalistic rules and norms, and their 
effectiveness, writes that “a rule is part of the system if it has been created in 
accordance with higher-order norms which, as secondary rules, authorize the creation, 
abolition or modification of the lower order norms (primary rules).”43 Further 
reasoning suggests that, in terms of creation,  
“metaphysically we can picture a rule arising out of an authorization 
by a higher rule or norm. Such an issuance, however, has nothing to do 
with a rule being created historically. The latter cannot be discussed 
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outside of particular historical circumstances and the action of the 
designated actors involved in such a process.”44  
 
This challenges the disembodiment that is representative of anarchy and the 
maintenance of its underpinning normative structure in the old sovereignty game. If 
‘old’ sovereignty, rigidly based upon non-intervention, is promoted ahistorically, is its 
meaning similarly detached? Can sovereignty have a meaning, and an existence, 
outside of historical circumstance, and if not, can it be positively comprehended, 
measured, changed or even overthrown?  
 In a system managed by the philosophy of de-historicised status quo, the norm 
of non-intervention is in itself cause and effect. It is an inescapable part of the 
constitutive rules creating logics of appropriate action reinforcing sovereignty as a 
constant. Moreover, it has a political effect that has increasingly been called into 
doubt as not intervening has had catastrophic consequences. Understanding change 
thus becomes increasingly important. Finnemore and Sikkink provide useful 
references for building a language of change. The concept of a proactive facilitator – a 
‘norm entrepreneur’45 and a ‘normative vacuum’ (and ‘normative space’)46 serve to 
colour-in our picture of how normative change might occur, and by these means to 
what end. They raise the point that “one of the criticisms of norm research has been 
that it provides no substantive hypothesis about which norms will be influential in 
world politics and under what conditions they will be influential.”47 Surely on the 
criteria of influence, intervention, as the antithesis of non-intervention, demands 
attention. However, this attention needs to go beyond measuring the effect of a 
putative norm of intervention on state behaviour in order to address the impact on the 
meaning of sovereignty and whether it is coming to be defined by the antithesis of its 
classical political consequence, non-intervention. Understanding the relationship 
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between intervention and non-intervention and how this is potentially changing the 
meaning of sovereignty becomes important. The dominant teleology of sovereignty as 
constant may be yielding to its ‘flip-side’, a teleology of sovereignty as change, 
requiring our account of meaning to pay renewed attention to the social and dynamic 
aspects of sovereignty The logic of consequence may be supplanting the logic of 
appropriateness.  
 
Continuity, change and teleology 
Maintaining a norm system in the face of multi-faceted opposition may produce two 
polar outcomes. Either the system realises its ultimate form by a process of 
incremental strengthening, or its opponents succeed in dissolving the mortar of its 
foundations. Alternatively, an uneasy balance emerges between the two, whereby a 
new, but inherently unstable, position is adopted containing in a delicate and shifting 
relationship aspects of both establishment and oppositional principles. This requires 
rendering malleable the establishment principle that the established teleology has 
petrified. Notwithstanding the fact that the norm of non-intervention is the 
underpinning convention of international relations, viewing this constitutive backbone 
of the ‘old’ sovereignty game as becoming a malleable entity in the face of pressures 
to address the consequences of a strictly interpreted non-intervention norm is a useful 
exercise for ascertaining, among other things, the hold of ‘entrepreneurs’ over future 
directions and how a teleology of change predicated on the basis of inclusivity and 
universality are changing the meaning of sovereignty and the norm of non-
intervention.  
 To re-cap along with Sørensen, “…the constitutive content of sovereignty can 
be seen as a foundational rule in the form of ‘X counts as Y in context C.’”48 That 
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there exists a context ‘C’ – the international society of states – undermines the 
continuity thesis founded upon the ‘old’ sovereignty game and all that it represents by 
denying an ahistorical, deontological proposition about sovereignty and restoring it to 
the social world. And yet it appears to remain the fact that “…constitutional 
independence is a permanent feature of sovereignty.”49  
 A certain degree of detachment is needed to visualise this constant. It is, by 
this formulation, an inanimate stabiliser which effectively counters the constantly 
shifting, organic processes which necessarily constitute every conceivable ‘society.’ 
Indeed, “…there is a stable element in sovereignty which marks the continuity of that 
institution. That stable element is the constitutive core of sovereignty: constitutional 
independence possessed by states which have territory, people, and government.”50 
 Westphalian sovereignty in this form seems simultaneously to represent and 
embody the undiluted strength of its founding principle of non-intervention. It does 
this to the point that it “…signals a status that has many specific, functional purposes 
in international diplomatic and legal practice, and to that extent it has concrete and 
useful meaning.”51 Does this cast doubt on any claims for meaning, regardless of their 
genesis? Perhaps so; “the inconsistencies in applying the rules under which 
sovereignty is accorded and the exaggerated and ambiguous claims that are made as 
to its meaning interfere with neither its legal value nor its utility.”52 
 The permanence may be mythic, then, but its centrality to sovereignty’s 
meaning is only now coming under sustained assault, with the potential for 
emphasising domestic, normative and dynamic factors. Is it, then, intact but 
superseded? Manoeuvres around it suggest a change of effective, if not literal 
meaning; “…the development of guidelines for the forcible delivery of emergency 
assistance, building upon both historical and recent experience, can break the human 
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rights-sovereignty deadlock that so often paralyses debate as well as decision making 
in a system where states remain the principle actors.”53 In other words, it can be re-
written by proxy. (Please check spelling in original, and add [sic] if necessary) 
 Changing the meaning of sovereignty does not therefore necessarily rest on 
the rediscovery of the historical ‘truth’ of a sovereignty very different from that which 
we assume. Neither does it necessitate a triumph for an alternative deontological 
proposition, such as universal human rights. An alternative construction, plausible 
within the existing system can, if backed with sufficient political conviction, have a 
significant impact on meaning, setting in train a logic of change that acquires and 
affects meaning in a fashion distinct from the logic of appropriateness granting 
continuity. In particular, proponents of normative change seeking to re-connect 
sovereignty’s international political role with its domestic meaning are able to 
highlight a normatively powerful and dynamic alternative teleological trajectory for 
sovereignty. Sovereignty as responsibility to and for the people who inhabit a state 
understood as a mechanism for the attainment of individual or communal fulfilment 
has powerfully re-entered international relations.
54
 This is not simply down to the 
impact of humanitarian crises on the agenda of international politics since the end of 
the Cold War, it can be traced back further than that, to the idea of a ‘new’ 
sovereignty game emerging in the circumstances of decolonisation. However the 
resolution of the tension between old and new in the meaning of sovereignty that took 
place at that time has come under renewed pressure since 1989. 
 
Logic, consequence and the rules of change 
Appropriateness in the international system is motivated by its own logic. The 
evolution of state behaviour frequently demonstrates another at work – the logic of 
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the ‘new’ sovereignty game. It is new because it involves new actors and new 
interests (or old ones, up against new problems) that seem to mark a significant 
difference in how we should formulate structure in terms of norms and intentions. 
 On the surface, the new sovereignty game “…involves basically two 
normative innovations: self determination of ex-colonies, and development 
entitlements of impoverished countries.”55 The state remains manifest as an 
impermeable unit, but:  
“…the contemporary society of states has been articulating a norm of 
human rights which limits the autonomy of all sovereigns including 
those in the Third World… The unintended effect of this norm is to 
differentiate between states in terms of humanitarianism, with many 
Third World governments classified as inadequate protectors of human 
rights.”56 
 
We must look to the generative principles of state behaviour to unpick the meaning of 
this putative system change. Jackson provides some key elements. Firstly, the 
contemporary society of states still contains players of the ‘old’ game, so that it 
cannot be entirely old or new. The uneasy balance between competing meanings is 
undoubtedly present. This is exemplified by the way that it is some of the old players 
who are most audibly articulating a norm of human rights. The consequence is to alter 
the basis for ordering the international system, downplaying fixed, foundational rules, 
and granting increased significance to current practice. 
 The logic that governs this type of action is that of consequentiality: “Logics 
of consequences see political action and outcomes…as the product of rational 
calculating behaviour designed to maximize a given set of unexplained 
preferences.”57 Behaviour is wilful, rational and calculating. But this does not mean 
unrestrained by rules and meanings. 
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 Any game, however innovative, is governed by rules – ‘regulative’ in this 
case. It is the conception of ‘antecedently existing activities,’58 beyond the elementary 
role of constitutive rules, which sets this formulation apart. The practice of 
sovereignty exists – it has a form recognisable to sovereigns and non-sovereigns alike, 
so that what occurs now is imprinted upon an existing template. March and Olsen’s 
litany in this case is for ‘anticipatory’ action, taking the form of questions and answer: 
“What are my alternatives? What are my values? What are the consequences of my 
alternatives for my values? Choose the alternative that has the best consequences.”59 
They observe that “despite the modern emphasis on the first litany [of 
appropriateness] as a justification for action, the second seems more often to describe 
action.”60 But this is in a predominantly domestic context. Internationally speaking, 
Krasner contends that “…the international system is an environment in which the 
logics of consequences dominate the logics of appropriateness.”61 If this is the case, 
the litany for anticipatory action firmly posits choice and values at the heart of 
international relations, reinforcing the need for the meaning of sovereignty to become 
reacquainted with its normative dynamic and challenge the ‘domestication’ of such 
issues through the sleight of hand of the denigration of ‘reductionism’. 
 Whilst Dyer recognises that realism is not bereft of value recognition, it 
nevertheless remains that the once pre-eminent paradigm holds that “…value 
considerations cannot play a part in ‘serious’ international political theory.”62 Further, 
“…by emphasising the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and concentrating on the 
cognitive force of ‘is’, realism tends to ignore the influence of ‘ought’ in the realms of 
knowledge and politics – an aspect of reality.”63  
 This requires more than simply accepting that issues of ‘ought’ exist alongside 
issues of ‘is’ in the current international political set-up. Kratochwil expresses simply 
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the difficulties in conflating ‘right’ (related to deontological ‘good’) with the order of 
things. The problem stems from theorising beyond positivist boundaries, “…due to 
the breakdown of an either ontologically or consensually conceived universal moral 
order, we have historically opted for a conception of ‘rights’,”64 that is, entitlements 
within a system, not immanently of the system itself. Morgenthau concisely 
summarises the realist position regarding the social foundations of human rights-led 
intervention;  
“…the absence of shared experiences, universal moral convictions, and 
common political aspirations…far from providing evidence for the 
existence of a world public opinion, rather demonstrates its 
impossibility, as humanity is constituted in our age.”65  
 
This pre-supposes the need for a metaphysical answer to an existential question, but 
must it necessarily be so? If intervention/non-intervention are polar opposites, or 
conceivably the same thing, then the cognitive force of ‘ought’ (set apart for a 
moment from the presumptions of values and their attendant weight) must be 
significantly affective if employed as an instigator of action in producing action 
different from the expected – a cognitive shift propelled either ontologically or 
normatively. The challenge of human rights is therefore more than finding a way in 
which to accommodate such rights within a system predicated on a sovereignty 
presumed to be hostile to such universals. An uneasy balance predicated on an 
assumption of the mutual exclusivity of sovereignty and human rights presumes the 
sustainability of a monolithic meaning of sovereignty as constant. As has been shown, 
the non-intervention/intervention and the international/domestic bifurcations of 
sovereignty cannot be sustained on a deontological basis necessary for constancy. The 
challenge of ‘ought’ is to the basis of the meaning of sovereignty and that this 
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challenge is being recognised, no matter how imperfectly it may be being met, is 
symbolic of how the meaning of sovereignty in an age of rights is under fundamental 
challenge. Intervention as an alternative teleology of sovereignty can produce change 
in contrast to the teleology of continuity through non-intervention that is dominant. 
The one can not exist meaningfully without the other. Thus the meaning of 
sovereignty must be explored through the meaning of intervention as well as through 
that of non-intervention if we are to avoid a largely fruitless search for metaphysical 
answers to existential questions.  
 
The meaning of intervention 
Intervention has for a long time carried a significant weight and its ‘pervasiveness’ in 
political practice is increasingly recognised as posing problems for the narrow 
spectrum of received wisdom.
66
 Casting our net, briefly, to the further edges of critical 
theory, it is worth noting here the intra-disciplinary contribution of more ‘dissident’ 
strands that have long been active at the margins of IR in providing an alternative 
narrative based on the discourse of sovereign history. Almost two decades ago, early 
post-structuralist contributions to the theory of sovereignty offered new ways of 
interpreting an ahistorical concept. Ashley describes the dual sovereignty of state and 
man, as conceived by modernity, as a clash between absolute forces. It is “…the 
practical disposition to privilege an historically constituted voice of ‘reasoning man’ 
as the sovereign centre and unquestioned origin of truth and meaning in history.”67 
This has implications for the fluidity of intervention as an accepted practice. Indeed, 
“in theoretical discourse on the anarchy problematique as in the modernist regime 
more generally, the construct of domestic society is chronically, necessarily, and 
unassailably privileged. It is so privileged because domestic society is taken to signify 
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the historical presence of a possibility condition that must be present if in history one 
is to invoke the sovereignty of ‘reasoning man’.”68 The difficulties in systematically 
prosecuting a complex programme or regime of intervention, and reconciling this with 
a definable sovereignty, are manifest in the disputed realms of agency and structure. 
 In a political landscape where change and continuity are often barely 
distinguishable, post-structuralists talk of an institutionalised “…pre-text of 
apprehension”69 falsely informed by “…the various reality-making scripts one inherits 
or acquires from one’s surrounding cultural/linguistic condition.”70 What this adds up 
to is an abdication of responsibility legitimated by the prevailing notion of closed 
state-hood. Rules and language are generated by and dispersed amongst territorial 
agents whose motivations are encapsulated by the texts of their lives. According to 
Campbell, “…we need to develop an approach to responsibility that is cognizant of 
the way in which reterritorialization of states necessitates a deterritorialization of 
theory.”71 
 Even a move away from ‘post-’ IR work reveals a discernable consensus in 
principle. The, as yet, largely uncharted ground offered to mainstream IR theory by 
the politics and law of the environment is one such positivist-friendly area. A return to 
a ‘primary point’ along the line of socio-political evolution – a kind of ‘proto-
theoretical’ leap – leads to notions of stewardship which in turn suggest the potential 
for a differently configured, wider sense of responsibility. The legislative option of 
‘soft’ laws, for example, when operating in regulated common spaces (nothing new to 
scholars of European politics), offers a theoretical and practical way out of 
intervention problems, shaping along the way a notion of ‘responsible’ sovereignty72 
as progress beyond the thorny issue of obligation. The difference being, of course, 
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that the ‘common space’ in question is a moral space, one which requires a theoretical 
foundation that accounts for its particular linear and temporal aspects. 
With one eye on the importance of substantive argument, Kratochwil voices 
concerns about focusing on empirical regularity alone; “Exceptions to a rule have to 
be based on similarly categorical norms rather than on mere considerations of 
efficiency in the pursuit of a desired end.”73 But when the rule is the polar opposite of 
the original or primary norm (or extension of the same thing), then is it not the case 
that categorical requirements are automatically fulfilled, calling only for a shift from a 
positive to negative formulation (or vice versa)? 
 To ascertain what intervention means can thus begin from where non-
intervention ends. Weiss and Chopra offer a way of re-visiting our political geography 
with a new conceptual tool – inclusivity: “Because humanitarian space is not linked to 
territory and transcends sovereign boundaries, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
speak of “intervention” within it.”74 This must involve a continuing process of 
disengaging humanitarian intervention from traditional, Westphalian sovereignty into 
a realm purely of its own defining. It is necessarily a long process, one that “…is in 
transition, and the term intervention has yet to be erased from the lexicon of 
international affairs.”75 If or when it is, will it achieve the position of having meaning 
without a label? 
 Weiss and Chopra argue for the depth of such a change as affecting the 
mechanisms which inform our conscious of what is and how it is;  
“the analytic significance of humanitarianism is that it reflects not a 
change in technology or phenomena but rather an evaluation in 
perception. This qualitative shift from “material interdependence” to 
“moral interdependence” necessitates an ethical vision in which human 
values supercede state rights.”76  
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But again it is the qualities of this vision which affect meaning, that is, a more 
fundamental question of ontology comes into play – whether an ethical vision is more 
legitimate and sustainable than a pragmatic or political vision as a manipulator of 
wills (or, indeed, whether an ethical vision can be all of these in effect).  
 For this type of contemplation, Dyer offers useful insights. Speaking of 
“Mervyn Frost’s account of the ‘positivist bias’ in the study of international 
relations…Frost argues that normative approaches and positivist theories are 
epistemological equals – though normative theory has some residual advantages over 
positivism.”77 A residual value drawn from their origin, perhaps? Not the reflection in 
the ‘mirror’ used in the correspondence theory of truth,78 but what is being mirrored 
itself – what is immanently real. In Dyer’s words,  
“…the introduction of a validating ‘realm of discourse’ opens up the 
possibility of assigning a similar cognitive status to both descriptive 
and prescriptive normative statements (value propositions) such that it 
is as acceptable to make truth claims about values themselves as about 
value-directed facts, though neither enjoys epistemological 
privilege.”79  
 
It is the discourse itself “(which)…provides a security of meaning without the 
liabilities of absolutism.”80 
 So there can be little doubt that intervention, used as it is by states in the name 
of humankind, is a moral principle. The issue of its meaning (and consequently that of 
sovereignty) seems to be reliant upon a cognitive status derived from epistemological 
roots that serve to legitimise its internal logic and the external, proximal reasoning of 
it. Skinner provides a general political formulation of principled action (which he 
does not necessarily agree with) that can be applied to intervention:  
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“To explain an action is normally to cite the goal that an agent wishes 
to bring about – corresponding to their motive for acting – together 
with the belief that the performance of the action will conduce to the 
attainment of the goal. If someone professes to be acting for the sake of 
a moral principle, and if the principle is genuinely their motive for 
acting, then it is obvious that the principle makes a difference to the 
action and will need to be cited in any attempt to explain it.”81 
 
If this is indeed the case, then intervention as a moral principle is effective because of 
its morality, as it is this which constitutes the quality of the action. Regarding the 
moral character of rules, Kratochwil takes a long view and explains that 
“communicative action, which evolves when ritualistic bonding in primitive society 
comes under pressure, establishes a conceptual frame within which the force of norms 
as conduct guiding devices can be discursively ascertained.”82 In other words, the 
moral quality or factor is identifiable when the scope of the containing unit (in this 
case rules) widens to incorporate other, related systems of thought and practice that 
have similarly reasoned ends. Concerning action, “…moral facts expressed in rules of 
conduct are valid not because of threatened deprivations, but because of their duty-
imposing character, which is in turn the precondition for the legitimacy of physical 
sanctions.”83  
 With non-intervention as the norm, a moral paucity is apparent in the ‘truth’ of 
the segregation of states. Intervention, on the other hand, is the realisation of a 
positive duty to act which is its very character, and therefore meaning – and by 
extension is the character of the international system it would embody. However, non-
intervention is not founded upon morality, it is a legal rule. Alternatively, 
intervention, as it currently stands, is conventionally moral. How the two are used on 
a practical basis provides insight into the meaning of both intervention and 
sovereignty.  
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 Kratochwil has produced four justifications for the transgression of a moral 
principle as opposed to a legal rule, the first of which adds most to the momentum of 
this particular discussion. Taking its cue from a logical background where “…we 
speak of a “violation” of legal rules; policies, on the other hand, are not violated but 
changed, precisely because the discretion allowed makes implementation usually 
solely a matter of the unilateral calculus of the actor,”84 the justification is that 
“…moral arguments utilize mostly “principles” rather than specific rules.”85 There is, 
though, a caveat (which may or may not affect the validity of the outcome) in which 
“this…means that much of the argument will turn on the questions of applicability of 
a principle, since principles do not specify their range of application. It is the 
specificity of legal rules…that leads often to divergent assessments of the “legality” 
versus the “morality” of an action.”86 
 Kratochwil’s fourth point on this matter is also useful; “…moral arguments 
often exhibit a great deal of indeterminacy and the moral analysis of an issue often 
cannot but point out the existence of a “dilemma” and leave it at that. Legal decision-
making, on the other hand, is characterized by the need to come to a final decision.”87 
Currently, the experience of intervention has not been conducive to its acceptance on 
anything other than moral terms. When legality and morality have met, sovereign 
status is apparently violated, for varying lengths of time, but so far without the 
consistency of approach to demand normative and systemic change. 
 What is left at the periphery of the debate is confusion in going forward. The 
moral/legal clash is difficult to resolve, especially in an environment increasingly 
pressured by the urgency of moral claims. Reus-Smit is dismissive of the mutual 
repellence of norms; “treating these as separate, mutually contradictory regimes 
obscures the justificatory role that human rights principles have performed in the 
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constitution of the modern sovereign order.”88 The ‘sovereignty as island’ formulation 
does not sit well; “The organizing principle of sovereignty has never been a self-
referential value; it has always been justified with reference to particular conceptions 
of legitimate statehood and rightful state action.”89  
 With this position in mind, it is clearly “…a matter of logical priority to have 
developed a conception of justice before policy can be conceived to promote this 
conception.”90 The argument most convenient for players of both sovereignty games 
is thus:  
“Acknowledging that there is a robust natural duty of justice that 
requires citizens to use their state’s resources to help ensure that all 
have access to a rights-protecting regime is an important theoretical 
advance in the doctrine of human rights. But from this alone it does not 
follow that it would be legitimate for the international legal system to 
enforce a duty on the part of states to contribute to the establishment of 
justice for all persons.”91 
 
This leaves sovereignty at a point of logical, ethical and political uncertainty having 
been enveloped by a social world. The demands of contemporary actors have 
distorted the bifurcation in sovereignty’s meaning that traditionally externalises 
intervention. This has served to create movement in the field of sovereign existence 
that not only ties a state’s domestic policies to its claims to sovereignty, but also 
challenges the utility of sovereignty in explaining other states’ responses to such 
challenges. Intervention not only affects the meaning of sovereignty for the ‘target’ 
state, but also for those acting, or failing to act, in the face of appeals to humanitarian, 
or other, necessity. 
 This (inter)active field of sovereign existence and action must be considered 
before any reason can be conferred on to the subject itself. Dyer provides a useful 
guide for doing this;  
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“…there is a degree of objectivity to be found in the need for 
coherence with ordinary experience – not in the positivist or empiricist 
mould, but in the sense that any explanatory scheme must give a 
plausible account of ‘reality’ – and this aspect of ‘facticity’ provides 
grounds for judging the merits of a particular interpretation, necessarily 
through the medium of a pertinent ‘language’ or discourse since these 
are the only available means of discussion.”92 
 
Sovereignty must, then, suffer the fate of being externalised without achieving 
meaningful connection with reality through its own generative principles if they are 
always relative to other, politically equal concerns. In other words, sovereignty’s 
meaning needs to be theorised in ways that include intervention, not in ways that treat 
it as sovereignty’s essential opposite. 
The theme of separation, characterises our visual and therefore logical 
representation of the field of enquiry. The reaction from genesis to process is of 
fundamental then teleological importance, naturally, but only when we have the 
appropriate language to describe it. What is appropriate language, of course, is still up 
for grabs. Regarding meaning and language, “…there are words, symbols, or other 
conventional devices that mean something or express something or symbolize 
something beyond themselves, in a way that is publicly understandable.”93  
Searle’s work provides a social logic for political action. The interaction 
‘across extended periods’ takes place not simply temporally but spatially, wherein the 
‘period’ transfers dimensionally to a unit of social action, thus affecting the 
procedural hierarchy of events and forging deeper into the historicity of any given 
moment. Each resonant moment along this chain then contributes to the overall 
logical structure of the (perceived) guiding principle – in this case, sovereignty. The 




From the origin of a well-documented yet imaginary past, Westphalian sovereignty 
still apparently evades capture. The ‘meaning’ of Westphalia, with little or no concern 
for the particularities of the late-medieval cognition that created it as an appropriate 
solution to the challenges of its time has been maintained into the present day in 
remarkable ways. The arguments for appropriate behaviour have been legitimised by 
reference to the idea that Westphalia was set in motion by the contracting parties with 
the intention that it would fluidly regulate present and future relations. By dealing 
with ‘statics,’ the event-less constants of received conduct, it has also managed to set 
in motion a great misconception. This is that an ahistorically reasoned concept must 
logically be subject to equally detached analysis – that its proper realm is a dimension 
apart from human experience, and therefore knowledge. 
The perpetual externalisation of sovereignty is the logical human partner for 
its ahumanistic, ahistorical positioning. Intervention upsets the order of things. It 
significantly alters the interactive parameters of states and efforts to incorporate it 
within the notion of a timeless logic of appropriate action strain the fabric of the 
settled notion of Westphalia to breaking point. Instead, the meaning of sovereignty 
needs to be understood through a recognition of the tensions that are an irremovable 
element of the meaning of sovereignty. Where there is a logic of appropriateness, 
there is the challenge of the logic of consequence; where there are normative 
pressures for constancy, there are normative demands for alteration; where there is the 
weight of the past, there is the opportunity of the future.  
Searching for the ‘meaning’ of sovereignty is thus a futile task. This is not just 
a simple historical point – that sovereignty has meant different things at different 
times and in different places – it is to assert that the meaning of sovereignty cannot be 
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settled in the social world. Even the ideas of logics of appropriateness and of 
consequence that have informed this analysis of sovereignty serve principally to 
highlight how it is that meaning is elusive. ‘Appropriateness’ may, indeed, reflect the 
procedural and bureaucratic accounts of sovereignty that have done so much to render 
it ‘static’ in the eyes of many.94 This, however, is to a considerable extent 
unavoidable. In arguing for the nature of the meaning of sovereignty in the terms of 
logics, we have been keen to emphasise that any such analytical construction brings 
with it privileged aspects of the social world to which sovereignty must be returned. 
This cannot be done ‘neutrally’ or ‘impartially’ and thus talk of the meaning of 
sovereignty, and of the role of intervention and non-intervention in constituting such 
meaning cannot be impartial. The challenge of intervention as an essential element in 
the meaning of sovereignty, rather than its opposite, is therefore not just about what to 
do when appeals to address a situation within a state seem irresistible, it is about how  
more adequately and appropriately to reintroduce sovereignty to that vital aspect of 
human existence from which it has so long been divorced – the social world that 
makes sovereignty meaningful, rather than simply a label.  
This meaning is currently going through a period of intense scrutiny and 
debate, seeing Westphalia’s meaning restored to the context of the social world. Pope 
Innocent’s famous claim about sovereignty was not just wrong in the sense in which 
he presumably meant it – rejecting the diminution of Papal authority that Westphalia 
brought about – but, more enduringly, the very terms he used to deny meaning to 
Westphalia and to the construct of sovereignty created upon its myth are indicative of 
a debate about the meaning of Westphalian sovereignty that remains live to this day. 
For the victims of humanitarian disaster Innocent’s language, when applied to a 
doctrine of sovereignty that legitimises non-intervention as the appropriate course of 
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action in the face of their human needs may seem apposite. Fortunately, this view is 
one that has gained discursive hold in international relations and the consequences of 
sovereignty are resulting in a period of dynamism in its meaning that is ensuring that 
whilst not ‘empty’ of meaning sovereignty’s meaning is in flux in ways that may 
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